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COMMITTEE TO DEFEND 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS V. 
MYERS: PROCREATIVE CHOICE 
GUARANTEED FOR ALL WOMEN 
The problem of birth control has arisen 
directly from the effort of the feminine 
spirit to free itself from bondage. 1 
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court established abor-
tion as a constitutional right for all women.- One might have 
expected that the following five years would have brought the 
end of the abortion controversy; instead, the first wave of vehe-
ment counterattacks led by anti-choice forcess had only begun. 
1. M. SANGER, WOMEN AND THE NEW RAes (1920). 
2. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179 (1973), the United States Supreme Court asserted that the right of privacy 
encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The Court 
also recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring both the health of the 
mother and in protecting potential life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 162. In resolving the 
conflict between the woman's unimpaired freedom of choice and the state's interest, the 
Court held that before the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, neither the state inter-
est in ensuring the mother's health nor in protecting potential life is substantial enough 
to justify an intrusion into the woman's freedom. Id. In the second trimester, the state 
interest in the health of the mother is sufficiently substantial to justify regulation. How-
ever, in the third trimester, when viability of the fetus is achieved, the state interest in 
protecting potential life justifies prohibition against abortion, except when necessary to 
protect the life of the mother. Id. at 163. 
3. The anti-choice or anti-abortion forces are usually called by their chosen names 
which are "Pro-Life" and "Right to Life." However, the terms anti-choice or anti-abor-
tion groups will be used in this Note to refer to groups advocating the elimination of 
legal access to abortion. Important among these groups is the National Right to Life 
Committee, an umbrella organization of anti-abortion groups. The National Right to Life 
Committee boasts a membership of over 11,000,000, and has affiliates in all 50 states. 
State organizations have been able to gather considerable financial resources, raised 
through tax-deductible contributions to their "education funds." RELIGIous CoALmON 
FOR ABORTION RIGHTS, THE ABORTION RIGHTS CRISIS (1978). The California Pro-Life 
Council, Inc. is the umbrella organization for the scattered California anti-abortion 
groups. 
Senators Joseph Montoya and David Roberti and Representative Alister McAlister, 
three of the legislators who have been most responsible for introducing bills infringing 
upon women's access to abortion, are on the Advisory Board of the California Pro-Life 
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Their banner was abortion, and their first major target was the 
most vulnerable-young and poor women.· 
Shortly after a five-justice majority of the United States Su-
preme Court reached its decision upholding the Hyde Amend-
ment, II which restricted federal funding for abortion, the Califor-
nia Legislature voted to severely restrict Medi-Cal funds for 
abortion in its 1978 Budget Act.' Implementation of the Califor-
There are some distinct differences between the two major organizations supporting 
and opposing abortion-the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL) and the 
National Right to Life Committee (NRLC). For example, NRLC members are more 
likely to bave been raiaec:l in large families, to prefer large families and to have 18l'Je 
families. NRLC members are also more likely than NARAL members to oppose sex edu-
cation in IIChools, the availability of birth control information to teenagers, divorce, and 
contraceptive sterilization. They are also more likely to believe that premarital, extra 
marital and homoaesual relations are wrong. Most NRLC members oppose the ERA; 
most NARAL members support it. NARAL has a higher percentage of female members 
and directors than NRLC. NARAL members are somewhat better educated, have higher 
incomea and more often live in large cities and their suburbs than NRLC members. Al-
most 70% of NRLC members are Catholic, while only 4% of NARAL members are 
Catholic. Almoet none of the NRLC members are Jewish; 17% of NARAL are Jewish. 
Participation by Protestants and Blacks is low in both NRLC and NARAL. Whatever 
their religion, nine out of ten NRLC members reported that religion plays a very impor-
tant part in their lives compared to one out of five NARAL members. Granberg, The 
Abortion Activittl, 4 FAM. PLAN. PBRsP. 157 (1981). 
4. Young and poor women have few resources to fight back against abortion restric-
tions and the moet to gain by the unfettered continuance of abortion services. In Califor-
nia, in 1976, 35% of alll8lill abortions were performed on women under the age of 20. In 
that same year, 50% of allleaal abortions were paid by Medi·Cal. PLANNBD PAJWI'I1IOOD 
Ano.IATU or CALJrORNIA, THa FACTS or LIn 1M CALIPORNIA 1981, compiled from STAft 
Da>AItTIimtn' or IhALTH SUVJCU ABORTION IbPoRTS (March, 1981). 
6. The Hyde Ameneiment altered the 1977 Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare (currently the Department of Health and Human Services) appropriations biD, 
and provided reimbursement for abortions "only where the life of the mother would be 
endangered if the fetus were carried to term." Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439 I 
209, 90 Stat. 1434. A second "Hyde Amendment" was passed in the summer of 1977 
allowing for funding where the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest in addition to the 
earlier exception for cases in which the woman's life was endangered. Act of Dec. 9, 1977. 
Pub. L. No. 95·205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460. 
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.s. 297 (1980), a majority of the United States Supreme 
CouIt upheld restrictions on federal Medicaid funding on abortions (similar to the pro-
poeed California Medi·Cal restrictions). Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the prosram provided unequal treatment in the distribution of public benefits, it con-
cluded that the Federal Constitution required no special justification for the distribution 
as long as the prOlJ'am placed no new obtacles in the path of the woman seeking to 
exercise her constitutional right. rd. at 315. 
6. The Budget Act of 1978, 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 359, § 2 (expired June 30, 1979), 
provided that abortions would be funded by the atate: 
(a> Where the life of the mother would be endangered if the 
fetus were carried to full term. 
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nia restrictions, however, was stayed until the California Su-
preme Court found the Budget Act restriction unconstitutional 
in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers 
(C.D.R.R.J.7 
Although the United States and California Supreme Courts 
interpreted similar statutory restrictions, the courts analyzed 
them under different constitutional theories. The United States 
(b) Where the pregnancy is ectopic. 
(c) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under 
Section 261.5 of the Penal Code, and such act has been re-
ported, within 60 days, to a law enforcement agency or a pub-
lic health agency which has immediately reported it to a law 
enforcement agency, and the abortion occurs during the first 
trimester. 
(d) Where. the pregnancy results from an act punishable under 
Section 261.5 of the Penal Code, and the female is under 16 
years of age, and the abortion is performed no later than the 
first trimester, provided the female's parent or guardian or, if 
none, an adult of the female's choice is notified at least five 
days prior to the abortion by the physician who performs the 
abortion. Regulations governing the notice requirement shall 
be promulgated by the Director of the Department of Health 
Services. 
(e) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under 
Section 285 of the Penal Code and such act has been reported 
to a law enforcement agency or a public health agency which 
has immediately reported it to a law enforcement agency and 
the abortion occurs no later than during the second trimester. 
(0 Where it is determined by fluid obtained through amni-
ocentosis that the mother is likely to give birth to a child with 
a major or severe genetic or congenital abnormality due to the 
presence of chromosomal abnormalities, neural tube defects, 
biochemical diseases, hemoglobinopathies, sex:linked diseases, 
and the infectious processes. 
(g) Where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to 
the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term, 
on account of any of the following conditions: Toxemia: renal 
failure: diabetes with vascular degeneration: thrombosis, Addi-
son's disease: high blood pressure with renal complications; 
high blood pressure with previous cardio-vascular accident: 
hydatdiform mole: congestive cardiac failure: and placentia 
previa, when so certified under penalty of perjury by two phy-
sicians, one of whom, where practicable, is a specialist in the 
affected medical discipline, and documentation thereof is pro-
vided with the claim for payment. 
7. 29 Cal. 3d 252,625 P.2d 779,172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). The California Legislature 
re-enacted the provisions of the 1981 Budget Act restricting Medi-Cal coverage for abor-
tion despite the California Supreme Court finding that the restrictions were unconstitu-
tional. C.D.R.R. subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandate and a temporary stay 
to prevent implementation of the statute. 
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Supreme Court found that no constitutional right was violated 
because the fundamental right to privacy only protected the wo-
man against undue burdens on her right to decide between abor-
tion and childbirth.' The Court found that the woman's right to 
choose was not unduly burdened because the government had 
not directly interfered with any fundamental right. The Court 
concluded that the Federal Constitution required no special jus-
tification for the government to withhold funds for abortion, but 
not childbirth, because the program placed no new obstacles in 
the path of the wo~an seeking to exercise her right of choice.' 
In keeping with three decades of California precedent,IO the 
California Supreme Court held that special scrutiny will be ap-
plied whether or not the state erects new obstacles that impede 
the exercise of a constitutional right;l1 the impediment may fall 
short of an absolute prohibition to the right. Unlike the United 
States Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged "both the practical importance of many governmen---
tal benefits to individual recepients and the corresponding likeli-
hood that a discriminatory benefit program will effectively 
nullify important constitutional rights. "11 
This Note will trace the development of the right to privacy 
as applied to abortion funding and as interpreted by the United 
States and California Supreme Courts. Although both courts 
have recognized the physical and psychological harm from 
forced childbearing or parenting, only the California court has 
been willing to unequivocally acknowledge the enormous impli-
cations on a woman's education, employment and associational 
opportunities. II For a woman, the right to privacy, inherent in 
8. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980). 
9. Id. at 315. 
10. See C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 263, 625 P.2d at 786,172 Cal. Rptr. at 873. 
11. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869. 
12. Id. at 268, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 875. 
13. Id. at 275, 625 P.2d at 791,172 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (citing Karst, The Freedom of 
Intimate Association, 89 YAU L.J. 624,641 n.90 (1980». For example, teenage parents 
have substantially less education, hold lower-prestige jobs and have greater job dissatis-
faction than their classmates who postpone childbearing. There are fewer opportunities 
for education and employment for teenage mothers than for teenage fathers who do not 
experience the emotional and physical problems of childbirth and usually assume less 
responsibility for the care of the child. Card &: Wise, Teenage Mothers and Teenage 
Fathers: The Impact of Early Child Bearing on the Parents' Personal and Professional 
Lives. 4 FAY. PLAN. PusP. 199 (1978). 
Women's Law Forum 
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the decision whether or not to bear a child, is essential for per-
sonal control of her body. Unlike the United States Supreme 
Court, the C.D.R.R. court has asserted that all women have the 
right to procreative choice. 
I. PROCREATIVE CHOICE: A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
GUARANTEED BY BOTH FEDERAL AND CALIFOR-
NIA CONSTITUTIONS 
The emphasis must not be on the right to abor-
tion but on the right to privacy and reproductive 
control. 14 
A. THE FEDERAL GUARANTEE 
The birth of the federal right of privacy was first announced 
in 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut. 111 The origins of the right 
and the areas included within the "zones of privacy"18 were am-
biguous; the members of the Court were unable h agree on the 
14. Cary, Life Faces Portia- How Feminists Are Changing the Law, Ms., Apr. 
1974, at 94 (quoting Ruth Bader Ginsberg). Without the full capacity to limit her own 
reproduction, a woman's other "freedoms" are tantalizing mockeries that cannot long be 
denied, since the chief rationale for denial disappears. Cisler, Unfinished Business: Birth 
. Control and Women's Liberation, in SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL 245-46 (R. Morgan ed. 
1970) [hereinafter cited as Unfinished Business). 
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The defendants, operators of a birth control clinic, were 
prosecuted for dispensing birth control devices to a married couple in violation of a Con-
necticut criminal statute which prohibited the use of contraceptives. 
16. Activities that take place in the home or a1fect marriage and childbirth have 
received the greatest protection. Less traditional lifestyles have been afforded less pro-
tection. Griswold recognized a constitutionally protected zone of privacy surrounding ex-
isting constitutional guarantees, but the Court failed to identify the parameters of the 
right. Nevertheless, the protected zone clearly includes a married couple's right to use 
contraceptives. The zone of privacy also protects certain activities performed within the 
home, such as the right to possess "obscene" materials. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 
(1969). 
Courts have responded divergently to sexual privacy cases. Compare Doe v. Com-
monwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (no constitutional rights where 
sodomy laws were enforced against two consenting adult males in private) with Ancofora 
v. Board of Education, 359 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Md. 1973) ("[T)he time has come today 
for private, consenting adult homosexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally pro-
tected interests") and Mindel v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 
(N.D. Cal. 1970). The Mindel court held that a man was illegally fired from the Post 
Office because he lived with a woman who was not his wife. The court found that be-
cause private sexual behavior is constitutionally protected, the state could not invade the 
sanctity of the man's home without compelling justification. The court did not specify 
whether the protection was due to the nature of the sexual behavior, the fact that the 
activity had taken place in the home, or because the government could not have discov-
ered this information without intrusive investigation. 
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precise constitutional basis for the right. Although seven of the 
justices believed the Constitution protected the right to privacy 
in some manner, no more than three agreed on any theory sup-
porting that right. 
Justice Douglas found certain unenumerated rights within 
the "penumbra" of existing constitutional guarantees.17 He con-
tended that "without these peripheral rights the specific rights 
would be less secure."IS "The present case," he concluded, "con-
cerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees."le The right es-
tablished by the Court was not to protect the individuals who 
might choose to use contraceptives; it was to protect the inti-
mate relationship between the married couple and their 
physician. so 
The right to privacy in the use of contraceptives was ex-
tended to individuals in Eisenstadt v. Baird:II 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy 
in question inhered in the marital relationship. 
Yet the marital couple is not an independent en-
tity with a mind and heart of its own, but an as-
sociation of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the indi-
vidual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.l • 
Thus, the right to practice contraception without undue 
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-85. Specifically, Justice Douglae con-
structed the right out of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth admendmente. 
18. Id. at 484-83. 
19. Id. at 485 (emphaeis added). 
20. Id. at 482. 
21. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). At the close of a lecture on overpopulation and contracep-
tion, Baird invited members of the audience to help themselves to contraceptive articles. 
He personally handed a package of contraceptive fOBnl to a young, allegedly single, wo-
man. Id. at 440 n.l. As a result of dispensing the fOBnl, Baird wae convicted of violating a 
statute (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 21-21A (West 1966» which made it a crime to 
sell, lend or give away any contraceptive drug, medicine, instrument, or article, except if 
the actor wae a physician administering or prescribing contraceptives to married persons 
or a pharmacist filling out prescriptions to married persons. Id. at 438. 
22. Id. at 453 (emphaeis in original). 
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governmental interference rests with the individual, not the 
marital relationship. The Court's recognition of the separate in-
tellectual and emotional entities of the couple was an important 
step for the liberation of women from unwanted childbirth. It is 
the woman who usually takes responsibility for the success or 
failure of contraception since she is the individual who is most 
directly affected by and concerned with pregnancy, its termina-
tion by either abortion or childbirth, and childcare. It follows 
then, that it is the woman who feels the greatest social, economic 
and health impacts as a result of governmental policies which 
restrict her ability to obtain obstetric care. 
The right of privacy to procure birth control evolved even 
further as a result of Roe v. Wadell and Doe v. Bolton." In his 
opinions for the Court,lIII Justice Blackmun proclaimed the deci-
sion to terminate a pregnancy is encompassed within the consti-
tutionally protected right of privacy.le The Court ruled, how-
ever, that the right to choose abortion is not absolute. The Court 
divided the full term of pregnancy into trimesters to facilitate its 
analysis concerning the competing interests between women and 
the state. With respect to the first trimester, because of the min-
imized health risks of abortion,17 the Court held the state has no 
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
24. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
25. The United States Supreme Court first addressed the abortion controveny in 
1973 when it decided Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton. Roe involved Teus statutes which 
made it illegal to perform an abortion unless it was necesaary to save the mother's life. 
Doe challenged Georgia statutes which limited the availability of abortions by requiring 
that: (1) The attending physician obtain the concurrence of two other physicians that 
the procedure was necessary; (2) a hospital committee make such a finding; (3) the abor-
tion be performed in an accredited hospital; and (4) the patient be a Georgia resident. 
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. 
27. Justice Blackmun relied heavily on the argument that abortion laws became UD-
constitutional when abortion became sarer than childbirth. ld. at 150 (citing Means, The 
Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus. 1664-1968; A COle 
of Cessation of Constitutionality (pt. 1). 14 N.Y.L. FORUM 411, 418-28 (1968). Tracing 
the history of New York State anti-abortion laws, Means asserts that the origin of that 
1828 law, and of similar statutes in other states, lay in a wish to protect women from the 
dangers of nineteenth century surgery, not in a wish to limit their control of their bodies. 
Means, supra at 411-515. One may question whether maternal protection was the entire 
reason for revoking women's common-law right to abortion. Perhaps the physician activ-
ists who led the crusade against abortion in the nineteenth century had personal, profes-
sional, or political motives. Although many physicians of that day probably regarded 
abortion as morally wrong, they were also intent on professionalizing the practice of 
medicine and restoring themselves to a respected position as leaders of society. F. JIt.P-
FEE, B. LINDHEIM & P. LEE, ABORTION POLITICS 65 (1981) [hereinafter cited as F. JAFR, 
7
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interest in regulating the decision whether or not to bear a 
child. IS During the second trimester the state's interest in pro-
tecting maternal health does arise. At this time the state is justi-
fied in imposing conditions upon abortion services to the extent 
that such conditions reasonably relate to the protection of the 
mother's health.1II During the third trimester, when the fetus is 
viable, the state's interest in protecting potential life is sufficient 
to justify the prohibition of abortion.80 
et all. The abortion issue gave licensed physicians a means to highlight the dangers in a 
procedure that was performed largely by "irregular doctors." [d. Legal abortion could 
have been viewed as giving health professionals an important means of optimizing their 
patients well-being; instead, it was viewed as threatening their roles. [d. at 66. At an 
American Medical Association (AMA) meeting in 1970, one physician noted: "'Legal 
abortion makes the patient truly the physician: She makes the diagnosis and establishes 
the therapy.''' [d. This obviously does not fit the physician's self-image as healer and 
teacher. The physician who declared, "'a woman is a uterus surrounded by a supporting 
organism and directing personality,''' would hardly want to be deemed merely a techni-
cian who carries out his patient's wishes. F. JAFFEE, et aI., supra at 64 (quoting I. Gald-
ston, M.D., cited in M. S. CALDERONE, ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, 118 (1958». 
Physicians are still reluctant to provide abortion services. Seven years after the Roe 
and Doe decisions, many women are still unable to obtain abortions either because there 
are no providers in the counties in which they live or the services that do exist are mini-
mal. Seima, Abortion Availability in the United States. 2 FA ... PLAN. PERSP. 88. 93 
(1980). In eight out of ten U.S. counties. services were not adequate to meet the abortion 
need. As a result. more than one million women were unable to obtain abortions in their 
own counties; five out of ten could not obtain them at all. [d. at 88. For some women. 
traveling to other counties caused them little difficulty. For others. especially poor, 
young and rural women, travel was difficult, if not imp088ible. [d. at 93. 
lt is very hard to believe that abortion was safer than childbirth in the early 1700's, 
or any other "legal" operation for that matter, yet. no law seemed necessary then. What 
happens if, once again, childbirth is made le88 threatening, from a physical standpoint, 
than abortion? Do anti-abortion laws suddenly become constitutional again? Or have 
women won the inalienable right to take calculated risks in their interest for self-deter-
mination? All the excellent health supporting reasons-improved health,lower birth and 
death rate, freer medical practice, happier families, sexual privacy-"are only embroi-
dery on the basic fabric: women's right to her own reproduction." Unfinished Businell, 
,upra note 14. at 276. That one reason belies the notion that women are only nurtuant 
creatures who welcome every new p088ibility of adding a new member to the human race. 
That a woman may not want another child, or even one child. requires admitting that 
the traditional espectation is a gr088 oversimplification of the nature of women. This was 
something the Supreme Court was not yet prepared to do. Erickson. Women and the 
Supreme Court: Anatomy ia Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L.R. 209. 255 (1974) (citing ROBBi, 
Abortion Law. and Their Victims, TJu.NSACTlON, Sept./Oct. 1966, at 7). 
28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.s. at 163. 
29.ld. 
30. Id. at 163-64. The Court defined viable as the point at which the fetus is poten-
tially able to live outside the mother's womb. even with the help of artificial aid. [d. at 
160. 
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Roe and Doe have been criticized for leaving unanswered as 
many questions as they resolved.81 One question important to 
women's rights is to whom did the Court entrust the right to 
decide whether or not to terminate pregnancy? At the beginning 
of his opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun wrote the "right of pri-
vacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."11 In a surprising 
shift of focus, Justice Blackmun turned to an entirely different 
relationship: the "physician and his pregnant patient. "II "For 
the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling point,' the at-
tending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to de-
termine without regulation by the state that the patient's preg-
nancy should be terminated."8. Finally, the transfer from the 
pregnant woman's right to decide to the physician's right to de-
cide for her was complete: "Up to [the third trimester,] the 
abortion decision in all aspects is inherently, and primarily, a 
medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with 
the physician."8& 
Following the rationale of Roe and Doe, does a woman, 
then, only have a right to terminate her pregnancy but not the 
right to decide to terminate it? If her right is to privacy, how 
can it be conditioned upon the concurrence of a physician? 
Clearly, to grant women the right to decide is to give women 
more power to shape their destinies; the very power which for so 
many years has been denied them. 
B. THE CALIFORNIA GUARANTEE 
The California Supreme Court first recognized the funda-
31. For example, Roe did 1'I0t decide whether a minor was entitled to abortion with 
parental consent or notification, or whether the father or husband had veto power. It also 
left vague the definition of viability. All these have set the stage for future legislation 
fountain-headed by anti-abortion groups. 
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. 
33. Id. at 156. 
34. Id. at 163 (emphasis added). 
35. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion ex-
panded upon the same reasoning: "The right of privacy has no more conspicuous place 
than in the physician-patient relationship, unless it be in the priest-penitent relation." 
Id. at 219. He then concluded that the Georgia statute at issue in Doe-requiring a wo-
man to obtain approval of two physicians in addition to her own for an abortion-was a 
"total destruction of the right of privacy between physician and patient and the intimacy 
of relation which that entails." Id. 
9
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mental right of procreative choice in People u. Belous.86 Belous 
was decided four years before the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged the existence of a comparable federal constitu-
tional right. I? The court found the statutory language, "neces-
sary to preserve the life of the mother,"aB unconstitutionally 
vague:a• "If the fact of ill health or the mere 'possibility' of sui-
cide·o is sufficient to meet the test of 'necessary to preserve her 
life,'41 it is clear that a showing of immediacy or certainty of 
death is not essential for a lawful abortion."41 The court held 
that such a definition would' be an invalid infringement on the 
woman's constitutional k'right to life48 and to choose whether to 
bear children."·· The court further asserted that the critical is-
36. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 915 
(1970). Belous, a physician and surgeon, appealed his conviction for performing an abor-
tion and conspiracy' to commit an abortion in violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 
(amended repeatedly since 1967) and CAL. PENAL COOl! § 184 (West 1970). 
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). See supra 
notes 15-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal guarantee of procrea-
tive choice. 
38. Section 274 of the Penal Code then read: 
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to 
any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, 
drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other 
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscar-
riage of such woman, is punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison . . . . 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (amended repeatedly since 1967). 
Section 274 now provides: 
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to 
any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, 
drug or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other 
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscar-
riage of such woman, except as provided in the Therapeutic 
Abortion Act. . . is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison. 
CAL. PENAL CoOl! § 274 (West Supp. 1981). 
39. People v. BeloUB, 71 Cal. 2d at 962-63, 458 P.2d at 198-99, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359-
60. 
40. People v. Abaranel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 48 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1965). The obstetri-
cian performed an abortion after receiving letters from two psychiatrists indicating an 
abortion was necessary to prevent a possible suicide. The court reversed the conviction 
because the state could not prove the necessary criminal intent that the abortion was 
performed for a purpose other than to save the woman's life. 
41. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 962, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
42.Id. 
43. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. "The woman's right to life is 
involved because childbirth involves risks of death." Id. 
44. Id. The Court based its finding of the right to chOOlle whether or not to bear 
children on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). "The fundamental right of 
Women's Law Forum 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/6
1982] REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 701 
sue was not whether the rights existed, but whether the state 
had a compelling interest in their regulation.4I The court con-
cluded the compelling state interests were protection of mater-
nal health and protection of the fetus.·8 
The court found that infringement of fundamental rights, 
resulting from a requirement that death of the mother be cer-
tain, was not justified on the basis of considerations of the wo-
man's health when abortion is during the first trimester of preg-
nancy.·? The pregnant woman's right to lifen took precedence 
over the state's interest in protecting potential life.·' Addition-
ally, the vagueness of the statute caused the physician to act at 
"his" peril when "he" determined that the woman was entitled 
to an abortion.60 Thus, the physician had a personal stake in 
reaching the conclusion that the woman should not have an 
abortion.61 The statute would have deprived those women of 
abortions who were entitled to them for medical reasons.6' 
The California Supreme Court declined to decide the con-
stitutionality of the Therapeutic Abortion Act6' because the act 
a woman to choose whether or not to bear children follows from the Supreme Court's 
and this court's repeated acknowledgment of a 'right to privacy' or 'liberty' in mattera 
related to marriage, family, and sex." People v. Beloue, 71 Cal. 2d at 963, 458 P.2d at 
199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
45. ld. at 964, 458 P.2d at 200, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 360. 
46. ld. at 965·67, 458 P.2d at 201·02, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 361·62. 
47. ld. 
48. The Court defined "right to life" as the right of a woman to be free from the 
risks of childbirth. ld. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
49. ld. at 969,458 P.2d at 203, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
50. ld. at 972, 458 P.2d at 204, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 364. 
51. ld. 
52. ld. at 973, 458 P.2d at 205, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 365. Again, it appears that a high 
court is constructing the right of procreative choice upon the foundation of health. 
53. The Therapeutic Abortion Act provides: 
A holder of the physician's and surgeon's certificate, as de· 
fined in the Business and Professions Code, is authorized to 
perform an abortion or aid or assist or attempt an abortion, 
only if each of the following requirements is met: 
(a) The abortion takes place in a hospital which is accredited 
by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. 
(b) The abortion is approved in advance by a committee of the 
medical staff of the hospital, which committee is established 
and maintained in accordance with standards promulgated by 
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. In any 
case in which the committee of the medical staff consists of no 
more than three licensed physicians and surgeons, the unani· 
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was adopted after the abortion performed by Dr. Belous. The 
act denies abortion unless the committee of the medical staff 
finds that "[t]here is a substantial risk that continuance of the 
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of 
the mother," and/or "[t]he pregnancy resulted from rape or in-
cest."&4 The proponents of change appear to picture women as 
victims----of rape, incest, or disease-never as shapers of their 
own destinies.1I11 Still, a woman's right to privacy to choose 
whether or not to bear children is contingent upon her victimi-
zation: She must be a victim of mental or physical disorder or 
rape to qualify for that which is hers as a person. This paternal-
istic attitude is almost always the basis for any reform of repres-
sive laws governing women. The C.D.R.R. court departed from 
this protectiveness rationale by insisting that "the constitutional 
right of choice is essential [for a woman's] ability to retain per-
sonal control over her own body." 
II. THE DIVERGENCE OF UNITED STATES AND CALI-
FORNIA SUPREME COURTS ON THE ISSUE OF 
ABORTION FUNDING 
A. FEDERAL DEFUNDING OF ABORTION 
In the wake of Roe and Doe, many states implemented 
abortion statutes in accordance with the standards set forth by 
the Supreme Court. However, because the Court left many ques-
tions unanswered, state legislatures, influenced by a very vocal 
minority,1I7 seized upon any means of limiting a woman's right to 
mous consent of all committee members ahall be required in 
order to approve the abortion. 
(c) The Committee of the Medical Staff linda that one or more 
of the following conditions exist: 
(1) There is substantial risk that continuance of the 
pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental 
health of the mother; 
(2) The pregnancy resulted from rape or incest. 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODB § 25952 (West Supp. 1981). 
"The term 'mental health' as used in Section 25951 means mental illness to the 
extent that the woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others or is 
in need of supervision or restraint." CAL. Hiw.TH &: SAnTY CoDa § 25954 (West Supp. 
1981). 
54.Id. 
55. Unfinished Business, supra note 14, at 275. 
56. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879. 
57. According to a survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of 
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procreative choice. Legislation limiting women's access to legal 
abortions have included mandatory information," consent'" and 
notification provisions,60 prohibition of advertisement or discus-
sion of abortion services,61 a requirement that all second trimes-
the University of Chicago (NORC) in 1980, only 10% of U.S. adults disapproved of abor-
tion under all circumstances: 
Circumstance 
(1) If the woman's health is 
seriously endangered 
(2) Pregnancy as a result of 
rape 
(3) Strong chance of defective baby 
(4) Family has low income and cannot 
afford child 
(5) Woman not married and does not 
want to marry the man 
(6) Woman married but does not want 
another child 
For any reason 
Average approval for the six specified reasons 
% which believed it 
should be poBBible 










Granberg & Granberg, Abortion Attitudes, 1965-1980: Trends and Determinants, 5 FAM. 
PLAN. PERSP. 250, 252 (1980). 
58. In 1976, the Supreme Court stated that some form of special informed consent 
requirement for abortion was legal, even if prior written consent was not required for any 
other surgical procedure. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,67 (1976). Fed-
eral district and appellate courts have either preliminarily or permanently enjoined 
mandatory information requirements which provided a description of the fetal character-
istics and giving biased information about the effects of abortion. Some courts have up-
held state provisions which require the physician to inform the patient of alternatives to 
abortion. See, e.g., Wynn v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978), alf'd, 599 F.2d 193 
(1979); Margaret v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Planned Parenthood 
Assoc. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health v. Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979). 
59. In 1976 the Supreme Court invalidated a MiBBouri statute which required the 
husband's prior written consent. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
The Court ruled that the decision whether or not to bear a child ultimately rests with 
the woman and her physician because it is she "who physically bears the child and who 
is more directly and immediately a1I'ected by the pregnancy .... " Id. at 71. 
In 1979 the Supreme Court held that a mature minor has the right to decide to have 
an abortion without parental consent. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
60. The Supreme Court has not decided whether states can require parental notifi-
cation. However, four states now have parental notification statutes in effect. They are 
Maryland, Montana, Tennessee and Utah. See REPRODUCTIVE F'REEDoM PRo.JECT ACLU, 
WOMEN'S LEGAL GUIDE To REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS I, 11 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Wo-
MEN'S LEGAL GUIDE). 
61. Some state laws prohibiting advertisement or discussion of abortion services 
have been invalidated. WOMEN'S LEGAL GUIDE, 8upra note 48, at 14 (citing Planned 
13
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ter abortions be performed in hospitals,62 and provisions for in-
dividual viability determinations.63 
It is the governmental restriction of funding, however, that 
has unquestionably been the predominant factor in limiting wo-
men's access to safe abortion.S. The first major case to deal with 
the constitutional issue of abortion defunding was Maher v. 
Roe.-" In Maher the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut Medi-
caid program which limited state funding for first trimester non-
therapeutic abortions.66 Harris v. McRae,67 the most recent 
Parenthood Assoc. v. Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980); Valley Family Plan-
ning v. North Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238 (1980). 
62. As of February, 1981, sixteen states require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed only in hospitals. They are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah and Virginia. WOMEN'S LEGAL GUIDE, supra note 60, at 12-
13. 
63. In Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), the Supreme Court held void for 
vagueness certain provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which statute 
provided in part: 
(a) Every person who performs or induces an abortion 
shall prior thereto have made a determination based on his 
experience, judgment or professional competence that the fe-
tus is not viable, and if the determination is that the fetus is 
viable or if there is 8ufficient reason to believe that the fetus 
may be viable, shall exercise that degree of professional skill, 
care and diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus 
which such person would be required to exercise in order to 
preserve the life and health of any fetus intended to be born 
and not aborted and the abortion technique employed shall be 
that which would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to 
be born alive so long as a different technique would not be 
necessary in order to preserve the life or health of the mother. 
(d) Any person who fails to make the determination pro-
vided for in subsection (a) of this section, or who fails to exer-
cise the degree of professional skill, care and diligence or to 
provide the abortion technique as provided for in subsection 
(a) of this section ... shall be subject to such civil or criminal 
liability as would pertain to him had the fetus been a child 
who was intended to be born and not aborted. 
PI.. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (Purdon 1977) (emphasis added). 
64. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 455 (1977) (Marshall J., dissenting) for a discus-
sion of the impact of abortion defunding. 
65. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). In Maher, plaintiffs attacked the Connecticut Medicaid 
program which limited state funding for first trimester, non-therapeutic abortions to 
those deemed medically necessary. 
66.Id. 
67. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). The majority upheld the constitutionality of the federal 
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abortion defunding case to be brought before the Supreme 
Court, addressed the controversial Hyde Amendment." While 
purporting to uphold Roe, the Supreme Court effectively limited 
Roe's application. According to the Court, Roe did not guarantee 
an unqualified right to abortion; the right protects the woman 
only from undue burdens on her freedom to decide to terminate 
her pregnancy by abortion." Since the state had not directly in-
terfered with that fundamental right, the Court applied mini-
mum scrutiny.'o Because encouragement of childbirth suffi-
ciently justified the withholding of funds by the state, no 
infringement was found.71 The Supreme Court has made clear 
that it will be unwilling to closely scrutinize state action which 
significantly affects a woman's exercise of her right to choose. 
Infringement of that right probably entails the state giving an-
other entity absolute veto power over her decision. 
Hyde Amendment. For a brief discussion of the Hyde Amendment, see ,upro note 5. 
McRae dealt with almost the identical i88uea as Maher. Maher involved a denial of fund-
ing for non· therapeutic abortiona; McRae involved a denial of funding for therapeutic 
abortions unleu they fell within the provisions of the amendment. Despite the majority's 
decision to uphold the conatitutionality of the Hyde Amendment which cut federal fund-
ing to states for most abortiona, some states have either voluntarily continued to fund 
abortions for indigent women (Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, Washington D.C.) or fund abortiona becauee 
of court order (California and Masaachusetts) or have suits pending in the courts (Con-
necticut and New Jersey). ACLU NBws, REPRODUCTIVB FREIDoy: VICI'ORY SpARK.8 Ac-
TION, April, 1981. 
68. See note 5 supra and accompanying text for a discu88ion of the Hyde 
Amendment. . 
69. rd. at 314 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473-74). In Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.s. 
179 (1973), the Court struck down certain procedural requirements which unduly bur-
dened the woman's ability to obtain an abortion: approval of a hospital committee, con-
currence of two other physiciana and performance of the abortion in a hospital. In 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), the Supreme Court found a spousal 
conaent requirement unconstitutional. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979), the 
Court determined that a mature minor need not obtain parental conaent for an abortion. 
According to the Maher court, while the above requirements unduly interfere with a 
woman's right to decide to obtain an abortion, governmental withholding of Medicaid 
funds for abortion but not for childbirth does not unduly interfere with an indigent wo-
man's right to decide. Theoretically, this may be true. A husband who can withhold con-
sent has absolute veto power over his wife's decision to have an abortion; a state which 
withholds funds from an indigent woman for abortion but not for childbirth does not 
have absolute veto power over her decision. Realistically, it is doubtful that a woman 
qualified for Medicaid will be able to obtain money for an abortion. Thus, the state's 
power to withhold funds for abortion but not for childbirth acts as an absolute veto on 
the indigent woman's decision to obtain an abortion. 
70. rd. at 315. 
71. rd. at 325. 
15
Erca: Reproductive Rights
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
706 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:691 
The Supreme Court has been willing, however, to inquire 
into the legislative motivation to determine whether or not the 
state action was premised upon an impermissible purpose. 
Under Village of Arlington Heights u. Metropolitan Housing 
Deuelopment Corp.,"s a plaintiff need not prove that the legisla-
tive action rested solely on an impermissible purpose, or "even 
that a particular purpose was the dominant or primary one."'71 
"When there is proof that an impermissible purpose has been a 
motivating factor ... judicial deference is no longer justified.'''· 
One evidentiary source is legislative or administrative history, 
"especially where there are contemporary statements by mem-
bers of the decision making body . . . .",11 
The Roe reasoning "necessarily entails the proposition that 
no governmental action can be predicated on the view that the 
previability period abortion is per se morally objectionable.'''' 
However, government may take action that has the effect of dis-
couraging women from seeking abortion as long as that action is 
not predicated on the idea that abortion is immoral."" The ma-
jority of the Court in McRae contended that Roe "does not pre-
vent government 'from making a value judgment favoring child-
birth over abortion, ... by the allocation of public funds.' ,,,. 
However, the" 'value judgment favoring childbirth' ... is pred-
icated on the view that abortion is per se . . . morally 
objectionable. ,,,. 
A review of the hearings on the proposed Hyde Amendment 
reveals that the perception of abortion as immoral played a very 
significant role in its passage. This is candidly illustrated by the 
representative who proposed the amendment: "[T]here are those 
72. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Village of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court SUB· 
tained the Village's refusal to rezone from a single·family to a multiple· family clasaifica-
tion. The Court held that "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because 
it results in a racially disproportionate impact." Id. at 264-66. The plaintiff was unable 
to prove that a racially discriminatory purpose was a motive in the Village's rezoning 
decision. Id. at 270. 
73. Id. at 266. 
74. Id. at 265-66. 
76. Id. at 268. 
76. Perry, Why the Supreme Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment 
Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1980). 
77. Id. at 1121. 
78. Id. at 1122 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-76). 
79. Id. at 1123 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-76). 
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of us who believe it is to the everlasting shame of this country 
that . . . this year over a million human lives will be destroyed 
because they are inconvenient to someone."eo Since an imper-
missible purpose was a motivating factor in the abortion defund-
ing cases, the Supreme Court should have struck them down. 
B. CALIFORNIA FUNDING OF ABORTION: Committee to Defend 
Reproductive Rights v. Myers 
1. Facts 
Prior to 1978, the Medi-Cal program paid for legal abortions 
obtained by Medi-Cal recepients as part of its general medical 
funding program. In 1978, however, the California Legislature 
inserted provisions into the 1978 Budget Act restricting Medi-
Cal funding of abortions. II 
Before the 1978 restrictions could take effect, the plaintiffs' • 
filed suit against Beverlee A. Myers, Director of the State De-
80. 122 CONGo REc. 20,410 (1976) (statement of Rep. Hyde). 
81. Budget Act of 1978, 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 359, § 2 (expired June 30, 1979). While 
the suit attacking the 1978 Budget Act restrictions was pending before the Supreme 
Court on petition for hearing, that act expired. It was replaced by an essentially identical 
provision in the 1979 Budget Act. Budget Act of 1979, 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 259, § 2 (ex-
pired June 30, 1980). The primary difference between the 1978 and 1979 acts is that the 
former provided funding for abortions to avoid severe and long lasting physical health 
damage only when that damage arose from ten medical conditions: Toxemia, renal fail-
ure; diabetes with vascular degeneration; thrombosis; Addison's disease; high blood pres-
sure with renal complications; high blood pressure with previous cardio-vascular acci-
dent; hydatdiform mole; congestive cardiac failure; and placenta previa. 
Plaintiffs then filed an original petition in the Supreme Court, C.D.R.R. V. Cory, 29 
Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981), seeking a mandate to bar enforce-
ment of the 1979 Act. The Supreme Court granted an alternative writ and stayed en-
forcement of the restrictions pending resolution on the merits. rd. at 260, 625 P.2d at 
783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870. . 
The 1979 Budget Act expired June 30, 1980, and was re-enacted by the 1980 Budget 
Act, 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 510, § 2 (1980) (expired June 30, 1981), which imposed restric-
tions on abortion funding identical to those in the 1979 act. Plaintiffs then filed an origi-
nal petition for mandate-C.D.R.R. V. Unruh, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. 
Rptr. 866 (1981), to restrain enforcement of the 1980 act. The Supreme Court issued an 
alternative writ and stayed enforcement of the funding restrictions pending their resolu-
tion. rd. at 285, 625 P.2d at 799,172 Cal. Rptr. at 886. Subsequently, the Court consoli-
dated the three actions and reversed. rd. 
82. The plaintiffs are comprised of various welfare and health care rights organiza-
tions: Women's Litigation Unit; San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Founda-
tion; San Francisco National Center for Youth Law; San Francisco Equal Rights Advo-
cates, Inc.; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., San 
Francisco; American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, Los Ange-
les; three physicians; one patient; and one taxpayer. 
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partment of Health Services, to enjoin her from enforcing the 
restrictions.8a The California Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one 
decision, held that the Budget Act was constitutional.84 The Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court reversed.811 
2. Issues 
In evaluating the constitutionality of the Budget Act, the 
California Supreme Court found that, under article 1, section 1 
of the California Constitution,88 all women in the state possess a 
fundamental right to choose whether or not to bear a child." 
The court employed the test long established by the California 
courts88 in determining whether the government could indirectly 
infringe upon a Medi-Cal recipient's freedom of procreative 
choice. Stressing that the state "bears a heavy burden of demon-
strating the practical necessity" for the unequal treatment, the 
Court followed the three-part test established in Bagley v. 
Washington Township Hospital District:88 
[1] Do the restrictions imposed on a poor woman's right of 
procreative choice relate to the purposes of the medi-
83. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 259, 625 P.2d at 800, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869. 
84. Id. (citing 93 Cal. App. 3d 492, 156 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1979)). 
85. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 285, 625 P.2d 779, 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 886 
(1981). 
86. CAL. CaNsT. art I, § 1 (1879, amended 1974) provide8: "All people are by nature 
free and independent and have certain inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, acquiring, poaeessing and protecting property, and pursuing 
and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." 
87. The California Supreme Court first recognized the existence of the constitu-
tional right of procreative choice in People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). 
88. In the three decades prior to C.D.R.R. II. Myers, the California courts have con-
sidered the legality of a variety of public benefit programs which sought to condition the 
receipt of benefits on the waiver of a wide range of constitutional rights. See Parrish v. 
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967) (receipt of 
welfare payments conditioned on the recipient's waiver of the right of privacy in his 
home); Bagley v. W88hington Township Hospital Diet., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 65 
Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) (hospital district discharged an employee because she refused to 
discontinue her activities in 8Upport of a recall election); Danekin v. San Diego Unified 
School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946) (conditioning the use of public echool 
buildings for public meetings so 88 to exclude "subversive elements" from using the 
echool for meetings); Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 
(1965) (excluding "subversive persons" from publicly supported low-rent housing 
projects). 
89. 65 Cal. 2d 499, 505, 421 P.2d 409, 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 404 (1966). 
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cal program ?IO 
(2) Does the utility of imposing such restrictions mani-
festly outweigh the resulting impairment of the wo-
man's constitutional rights?'1 
[3] Do the statutory provisions serve the state interest in 
providing medical care to the poor in a manner least 
offensive to the woman's right of procreative choice?'· 
3. Analysis 
In March, 1981, the California Supreme Court held that the 
California statutory restriction limiting Medi-Cal funding for 
abortions was unconstitutional. IS Although the United States 
Supreme Court in Maher' • and in McRae,a upheld similar re-
strictions, the California Court reasoned that, because the fed-
eral cases presented no state constitutional question, the federal 
court had not addressed or resolved the question of whether the 
restrictions were consonant with California constitutional guar-
antees. The court concluded that Budget Act restrictions im-
posed on California poor women must be determined by the 
state courts: "[J]ust as the United States Supreme Court bears 
the ultimate judicial responsibility for determining matters of 
federal law, the [California Supreme Court] bears the ultimate 
judicial responsibility for resolving questions of state laws."" 
To determine the constitutionality of the Budget Act re-
strictions under California law, the court started from the pre-
mise, first asserted in Belous9'1 in 1969, that the fundamental 
right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear children fol-
lowed from the right of privacy in matters related to marriage, 
family and sex.18 While procreative choice is so fundamental 
90. ld. at 505-06, 421 P.2d at 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 404. 
91. ld. at 506, 421 P.2d at 413, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 405. 
92. ld. at 507, 421 P.2d at 413, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 405. 
93. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869. 
94. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1976). See supra notes 65-SO and accompanying 
text for a discussion of this case. 
95. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See supra notes 67-SO and accompanying 
text for a discussion of this case. 
96. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 261-62, 625 P.2d at 783,172 Cal. Rptr. at 870. 
97. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, SO Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). See supra notes 36-52 and accompanying test for a discus-
sion of this case. 
98. ld. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
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that it merits the protection of both federal and state constitu-
tional guarantees of privacy, the California provision is explicitly 
guaranteed.ee Recently the court has ruled that California's con-
stitutional guarantee of privacy is more protective than its fed-
eral counterpart in areas of familial autonomy and sexual 
freedom. loo 
The court in C.D.R.R. was more sensitive to the implication 
of unwanted childbirth than the United States Supreme Court. 
It asserted that "[c]losely related to this fundamental interest in 
life and health is the basic recognition that, for a woman, the 
constitutional right of choice is essential to her ability to retain 
personal control over her own body!'lOl Other than in health 
terms, nowhere in either Belous or Roe did the courts stress the 
profound impact of unwanted childbirth upon a woman. In 
C.D.R.R. the coUrt recognized that: " 'The implications of an un-
wanted child for a woman's education, employment and associa-
tional opportunities (often including marriage opportunities) are 
of enormous proportion.' "101 
99. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1879, amended 1974). See supra note 86 for the text of 
this provision. 
100. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 
539 (1980). The California Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance which defined 
"family" as an individual or two or more persons related by blood, marriage or legal 
adoption or a group of not to exceed five other persons. The Court held that the distinc-
tion drawn by the ordinance between related and unrelated persons violates the right of 
privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution. Compare City of Santa Barbara v. 
Adamson with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (sustaining an ordi-
nance similar to that in Santa Barbara). 
101. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879. 
102. Id. at 275, 625 P.2d at 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (quoting Karst, supra note 13, 
at 641, n.90). Another commentator has stated: 
Of all the decisions a person makes about his or her 
body, one of the most profound and intimate relate to 
whether, when and how one's body is to beCome the vehicle 
for another human being's creation. If a man is the involun-
tary source ot a child-if he is forbidden, for example, to prac-
tice contraception-the violaiion of his personality is 
profound; the decision that one wanta to engage in sexual in-
tercourse but does not want to parent another human being 
may reflect the deepest of personal convictions. But if a wo-
man is forced to bear a child-not simply to provide an ovum 
but to carry the child to term-the invasion is incalculably 
greater. 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 924 (1978), quoted in, C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 
Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792,172 Cal. Rptr. at 879. Thus, quite apart from the physical 
experience of pregnancy itself, an experience which of course has no analogue for the 
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After the court established that the right of privacy em-
braces procreative choice, it turned to the question of whether 
the statutory restriction on abortions funded by Medi-Cal re-
quired the surrender of a constitutional right as a condition to a 
benefit. If abortion and childbirth are independent constitu-
tional rights, the government offends no constitutional principle 
by funding one and not the other, because the state has unques-
tioned authority to subsidize the exercise of one fundamental 
right without incurring an obligation to fund another. lOS 
According to the California Supreme Court in Belousl~ and 
the United States Supreme Court in Roe,loa abortion and child-
birth are not independent constitutional rights. They are, rather, 
two aspects of a single right to procreative choice. The dissent in 
C.D.R.R. complained, however, that the legislature is merely 
"funding childbirth of some women."loe However, as the major-
ity pointed out, the state is not obligated to provide medical 
care to the poor, although once benefits are made available, it 
bears a heavy burqen in justifying any statutory provision which 
withholds benefits from qualified individuals solely because they 
exercise a constitutional right. IO'7 The Attorney General argued, 
however, that the state violates no constitutional precept when 
it merely declines to extend a public benefit to individuals "who 
choose to exercise a constitutional right in a manner the state 
does not approve and does not wish to subsidize."loB 
According to the Supreme Court in McRae, the Federal 
male, there is the attachment the experience creates, partly physiological and partly psy-
chological, between mother and child. Jd. "lIlt is difficult to imagine a clearer case of 
bodily intrusion, even if the original conception was in some sense voluntary." C.D.R.R. 
v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879 (quoting L. TRIBE, 
supra, at 924). 
103. For example, public and private educational rights are distinct constitutional 
rights. The guarantee oC a free education is secured by the California Constitution, CAL. 
CON ST. art. I, §§ I, 5, while the right to attend a non-public school is an aspect of the 
protection of liberty embodied in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, Pierce v. Society Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
104. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. 
denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). 
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
106. The breadth of the Medi-Cal program itself belies any suggestion that the state 
is giving only the specialized benefit of medical expense for childbirth as Medi-Cal also 
funds contraception and sterilization. 
107. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869. 
108. Id. at 263, 625 P.2d at 785, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 872. 
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Constitution requires no special justification for the discrimina-
tory treatment of childbirth and abortion as long as the govern-
mental action places no new obstacles in the path of the woman 
seeking to exercise her decision. 1011 However, governing Califor-
nia cases have long held that a discriminatory government bene-
fit program demands special scrutiny whether or not it erects 
new obstacles that impede the exercise of a constitutional 
right. no 
In order to satisfy this special scrutiny, the state is required 
to show that it has a compelling interest for implementing the 
conditional prerequisites for receipt of the benefits.111 To test 
whether the state interest in withholding funds for abortion (but 
not childbirth) was compelling, the California Supreme Court 
employed the three-part standard historically used to measure 
the constitutionality of statutory schemes which condition re-
ceipt of benefits upon the waiver of a constitutional right. 111 
According to the test, the state must demonstrate: (1) the 
imposed conditions relate to the purpose of the legislation which 
confers the benefit or privilege, (2) the utility of imposing the 
109. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315. 
110. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781,172 Cal. Rptr. at 869. A 
comparison of California and United States Supreme Court decillions demonstrates the 
divergence between the state and rederal interpretations.ld. at 266, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 
Cal. Rptr. at 873. In Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. 623 (1967), the California Supreme Court applied the Bosley three-part standard 
and found the governmental conditioning or the receipt or welrare benefits upon a recipi-
ent's waiver or his constitutional right or privacy in his name to be unconstitutional. By 
contrast, the United States Supreme Court in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), 
subjected a similar governmental intrusion upon the rights or welfare recipients to a 
lesser degree of scrutiny and then upheld the governmental policy. In Wirta v. Alameda-
Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967), the 
California Supreme Court struck down a discriminatory public transit advertising policy 
which made advertising space on public buses available ror commercial expression but 
denied this benefit to those who wished to advertise their political views. The United 
States Supreme Court in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 41S U.S. 298 (1974), sus-
tained the unequal advertising policy when it declined to use strict scrutiny. The Caliror-
nia Supreme Court in Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 292 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. 
Rptr., 625 (1964), used strict standards when it tested the constitutionality of limitations 
on the political activities of public employees. By contrast, the United States Supreme 
Court in U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Asa'n or Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 
(1973), upheld broad restrictions on political activities of rederal employees when it used 
a less demanding standard. 
111. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 265, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873. 
112. Id. at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868. 
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conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment 
of constitutional rights, and (3) the unavailability of less offen-
sive alternatives.ll3 The statutory restrictions failed to satisfy all 
three parts. 
First, the restriction imposed on poor women who seek to 
exercise their constitutional right of procreative choice bears no 
relation to the fundamental purpose of the Medi-Cal program.1l4 
Indeed, the restrictions are contrary to the primary purpose of 
the program which is to alleviate the expense of those who can-
not afford needed medical care.11& The Budget Act restrictions 
on abortion funding would instead cause poor women to be sub-
jected to significant health hazards or even death.u , 
Second, the utility of the funding benefits does not mani-
festly outweigh the impairment of constitutional rights because 
the fiscal advantages are illusory1l7 and the purported state in-
113. Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., 65 Cal. 2d at 505-06, 421 P.2d 
at 412, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 404. 
114. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 271, 625 P.2d at 790, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877. 
The purpose of Medi-Cal "is to afford health care and related remedial or preventive 
services to recipients of public assistance and to medically indigent aged and other per-
sons, including related social services which are necessary for those receiving health care 
•••• tt CAL. WEU'. & INST. CODE § 14000 (West 1980). 
115. In 1979, 187,312 legal abortions were performed in California. Of those, approx-
imately 52% were paid by Medi-Cal. PLANNED PARENTHOOD AFFILIATES OF CALIFORNIA, 
THE FACTS OF LIFE IN CALIFORNIA 1981 (March, 1981) (compiled from State Department 
of Health Services Abortion Reports). 
116. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 272, 625 P.2d at 690, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877. 
About 1,000,000 abortions were probably performed every year in the United States 
prior to Roe v. Wade. Unfinished Business, supra note 14, at 260. See generally E. 
BATES & E. ZAWADSKI, CRIMINAL ABORTIONS (1964). The most accurate figure estimating 
the number of deaths from septic abortions during the same period is between 500 and 
1,000 deaths. This does not include the number of women who die each year from causes 
related to real or imagined unwanted pregnancies-like suicide, murder or automobile 
"accidents." Unfinished Business, supra note 14 at 260 (citing Tietze & Lewit, Abortion, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Jan., 1969, at 23). The legislative restrictions would have us return 
to the days when one percent of the women choosing to risk abortion die. 
117. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 277-78, 625 P.2d at 793-94, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 
881-82. 
Minimal Costs Associated With 
Unwanted l!irths 
Abortion ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. $ 379 
Medi-Cal births. . . . . ..................... ' 2,225 
One year follow-up care.. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,173 
One year AFDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3,972 
One year foodstamps ............. ......... 240 
One year fostercare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,021 
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terest in protecting nonviable life cannot subordinate a woman's 
right of procreative choice.ll8 The Court recognized the "actual 
impairment of constitutional rights will be severe indeed."ne 
The purpose of the Medi-Cal program belies any contrary sug-
gestion, since the women who are most affected by the restric-
tions are the ones least able to pay for medically safe abortions. 
The budget restrictions do not merely provide a benefit which 
the indigent pregnant woman is realistically free to accept or re-
fuse; on the contrary, the state is using the power of its purse to 
enforce compulsory childbirth.lI0 The Court concluded that stat-
utory restructions would "severely impair or totally deny" the 
exercise of the woman's constitutional right and "only the most 
compelling of state interests" could satisfy the second prong of 
the Bagley text. 111 
The neutrality stance adopted by the court prevents the 
state from failing to subsidize a disfavored method of exercising 
a constitutional right. Even if the state can show a compelling 
inter~st in protecting a nonviable fetus, the state cannot pursue 
that interest in the discriminatory manner adopted by the legis-
lature.111 The state statutory scheme did not protect "all fetuses 
by promoting their interests over the rights of all women. "111 In 
the past, the court has criticized statutory schemes that restrict 
Adoption service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4,263 
These figures are based on 1977 coats. PLANNED PARENTHOOD ArrILIATES OF CALIFORNIA, 
MlmI·CAL ABoRTION: COST FACTORS (1980) (compiled Crom State Department of Health 
Services Abortion Reports). 
118. The rights involved are "the woman's right to liCe and to choose whether to 
bear children." C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 274, 625 P.2d 792,172 Cal. Rptr. at 879 
(quoting People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359). Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1969), established permissible standards for state regulations of 
abortions, holding that prior to the third trimester of pregnancy the state may regulate 
only to protect the woman's health. Only during the third trimester may the state enact 
restrictions to protect the viable fetus. The state's efforts to limit first and second trio 
mester abortions to protect the Cetus "inverts the priority of interests established in Roe 
and improperly subordinates the woman's right of choice to the lesser state interests 
established in Roe and improperly subordinates the woman's right of choice to the lesser 
state interests in protecting a nonviable Cetus." C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 280, 625 
P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (1981). 
119. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 275, 625 P.2d at 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878. 
120. Id. at 276, 625 P.2d 791, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878. 
121. Id. (emphasis added). 
122. Id. at 281, 625 P.2d at 794, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 881. 
123. Id. 
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the rights of the poor more severely than others. Ill. 
And third, the state has less restrictive alternatives: It can 
meet the needs of indigent women without burdening their con-
stitutional right of procreative choice by impartially funding 
both childbirth and abortion.12II The court appropriately ac-
knowledged that the implications of an unwanted child for a wo-
man's education, employment and associational opportunities 
are enormous.126 For a woman of low income, the results can be 
devastating.12? The court concluded that the decision whether or 
not to bear a child "is so private that each woman in California, 
rich or poor, is guaranteed the constitutional right to make that 
decision as an individual, uncoerced by governmental intru-
sion."128 The morality of abortion should be free to live in each 
home; it is not a legal or constitutional matter.l28 
III. CONCLUSION 
The abortion funding controversy has been but one aspect 
of the battle to keep the impact of Roe and Doe within the most 
narrow confines. Since 1973, anti-choice forces have been able to 
lobby for the passage of numerous restrictions. 
124. Id. See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 
(1976). In Serrano the California Court struck down a school financing system, based 
upon local district taxes, as violating the equal protection clause of the California Consti-
tution. The court found wealth to be a suspect' class in this context because it touched 
upon a fundamental right (education) under the California Constitution and thus war· 
ranted a strict scrutiny analysis. The Supreme Court has recently reached the opposite 
conclusion in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1974), based 
upon the Federal Constitution. In Serrano the California Supreme Court recognized the 
quality of education one receives will have a direct impact upon the opportunities availa-
ble in the work force and society at large. The court therefore held education a funda-
mental right. 18 Cal. 3d at 766, 557 P.2d at 951, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 367. The court rea-
soned that a system based upon local taxes resulted in varing qualities of education 
depending upon the wealth of the community in which the school was situated. Because 
wealth is a suspect classification under the California Constitution and, because a funda-
mental right was involved, the court found the financing plan violated the state equal 
protection clause. 
125. Id. at 283, 625 P.2d at 795, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 882. 
126. Id, at 275, 625 P.2d at 791,172 Cal. Rptr. at 878, (quoting Karst, supra note 13, 
at 641, n.90). 
127. In 1977, it cost a low-income family $44,000 to raise a child to age eighteen on a 
bare minimum standard of living. PLANNED PARENTHOOD AFFILIATES OF CALIFORNIA, 
MEDI-CAL ABORTION: COST FACTORS (1980) (compiled from Population Reference Bureau 
Statistics (May, 1977». 
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When the question of public funding of abortion came 
before the United States Supreme Court, it held that no funda-
mental right was infringed because the right of privacy only pro-
tected the woman from undue burdens on her right to decide.1SO 
Because the government had not unduly burdened her choice by 
direct interference, the Constitution required no close judicial 
scrutiny. 181 
The California Supreme Court, by contrast, has not been as 
deferential to the state legislature as the Supreme Court has 
been to Congress. In a line of California cases beginning with 
Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, I8lI the California 
court has required the state to show a compelling interest when 
the government seeks to grant a public benefit conditioned upon 
the recipient's waiver of a fundamental right. Although the 
waiver may fall short of an absolute prohibition of the right, it 
need only impede the actual exercise of the right.13I Perhaps the 
real power of the Danskin line of cases lies in the fact that the 
California Supreme Court has made clear that it will take an 
active role in examining the constitutionality of governmental 
impediments to the implementation of constitutional rights. 
In C.D.R.R., the state funding restrictions represented an 
attempt by the state to condition the receipt of medical pay-
ments for the termination of pregnancy upon the waiver of the 
woman's right to choose abortion. Mter the California Supreme 
Court closely examined the governmental interests, it found the 
state could assert no compelling interests for funding childbirth, 
but not abortion. The decision has guaranteed that thousands of 
poor women, who each year must face the decision whether or 
not to have an abortion, may do so unhampered by governmen-
tal interference. 
Alison Erca 
130. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980). 
131. [d. at 315. 
132. Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536,171 P.2d 885 (1946). 
133. C.D.R.R. v. Myers, at 263, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873. 
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